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Abstract
It is possible for an insurgency to develop from a single cause, for the
insurgents to identify and communicate this unifying cause to the
population, and for the insurgents to remain steadfastly focused even as
counterinsurgents undermine their organization and redress the cause.
But often the case that there is no single cause, that popular support is
mobilized by appealing to multiple motivations, and that by the time
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counterinsurgents resolve the initial grievance, the insurgency has found
alternative justifications to mobilize popular support. Since insurgent
leadership is often competent and adaptive, it would be wise to consider
the latter scenario against any counterinsurgency strategy. Yet, even
when this is acknowledged in the counterinsurgency literature, the
theory is remarkably silent how this affects the choice of operational
approach This paper addresses this gap and offers a framework for more
accurately mapping, understanding, anticipating, and addressing the
multiple causes that draw adherents to insurgency and allow for its
perpetuation.
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Introduction 
There is much already written on the importance of winning “hearts and 
minds” and how this relates to the insurgent cause.1 However, most works on 
the causes of insurgency tends to focus on the spark that ignited the 
insurgency.  That is, the stated list of issues, grievances, or indeed insults, that 
engaged the hearts and minds of the population sufficiently to motivate them 
to rebel.  Crisis events and initial grievances may serve as a catalyst for the 
mobilization of an insurgent movement; however, it is often discovered in 
retrospect that underlying societal tensions fomented rebellion before and 
after the seemingly critical spark event.  In fact, successful insurgents 
continue to identify and leverage underlying tensions in a society as part of 
their cause to further the movement and expand participation.  In many 
cases, multiple tensions and propensities fueling the insurgency overlap and 
intertwine with one another, weaving a complex web that confuses and 
deceives both academic and military attempts to determine appropriate 
approaches to defusing the cause of the insurgency.  
 
It is possible for an insurgency to develop from a single cause, for the 
insurgents to identify and communicate this unifying cause to the population, 
and for the insurgents to remain steadfastly focused even as counterinsurgents 
undermine their organization and redress the cause.  But often the case that there 
is no single cause, that popular support is mobilized by appealing to multiple 
motivations, and that by the time counterinsurgents resolve the initial grievance, 
the insurgency has found alternative justifications to mobilize popular support. 
Since insurgent leadership is often competent and adaptive, it would be wise to 
consider the latter scenario against any counterinsurgency strategy.  Yet, even 
when this is acknowledged in the counterinsurgency literature, the theory is 
remarkably silent how this affects the choice of operational approach. We must 
venture outside of the standard counterinsurgency (COIN) literature to address 
this gap. 
 
The structure of this article is as follows.  The next section briefly reviews the 
way classic COIN theories deal with underlying tensions and the insurgent 
                                                     
1 Galula, David, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger, 
1964); Record, Jeffrey, Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win (Dulles, VA: Potomac 
Books, 2007); Ktison, Frank, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, and 
Peacekeeping (Saint Petersburg, FL: Hailer, 1973); O'Neill, Bard, Insurgency and 
Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 
2005); James, Anthony, Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of 
Counterinsurgency (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2004). 
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cause.  This is followed by two case studies in the Philippines and Indonesia, 
which illustrate how propensities and tensions within a society give rise to 
and sustain the insurgents’ cause.  Next, the authors introduce a framework 
for considering insurgencies with more than one potential cause.  This 
presents a number of practical implications for COIN strategy, which are 
developed in the last section.  
 
The Cause in Counterinsurgency Theory  
Roger Trinquier’s early recognition of the link between underlying tensions in 
society and insurgent movement formation is a good place to begin this 
discussion.  Trinquier notes: 
 
“Warfare is now and interlocking system of actions—political, 
economic, psychological, military—that aims at the overthrow of the 
established authority in a country and its replacement by another 
regime. To achieve this end, the aggressor tries to exploit the 
international tensions of the country attacked—ideological, social, 
religious, economic—any conflict liable to have a profound influence 
on the population to be conquered [italics in original].”2 
 
Trinquier identifies four broad categories of tension in the above quote: 
ideological, social, religious and economic, which seem to encompass most of 
the specific complaints that could emanate from a group in society and be 
used by an exploitative insurgent or group of insurgents to develop a cause 
which can be used to rally support around.  Trinquier also emphasizes that 
the tensions that can turn into the foundation of an insurgent cause seemed 
limitless even in 1964.  He observes that, “from a localized conflict of 
secondary origin and importance, they will always attempt sooner or later to 
bring about a generalized conflict.”3  
 
It is ironic that while Trinquier observes underlying tensions as being 
fundamental to the cause and insurgency formation and sustainment, he 
spends the rest of his book explaining how population and resource control 
through accurate censuses, intelligence, and restricting and monitoring 
movement, is the key to victory.  His original observations regarding tensions 
seems lost and it is almost as if he has taken for granted that once an 
insurgency begins, it must be dealt with using almost the same COIN methods 
                                                     
2 Trinquier, Roger, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency (Fort 
Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1964): 20, 22. 
3 Ibid, 6. 
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that the insurgent is employing: clamping down on the population instead of 
addressing those issues that are fueling the movement.  
 
Galula places more emphasis on the necessity of the cause and notes that, 
“problems of all natures are exploitable for an insurgency.”4  But he does not 
discuss these problems in terms of tensions or even local grievances, instead 
focusing on what makes a good and sustainable cause.  While Trinquier 
explains the role of tensions in cause formation well, Galula does a far better 
job of providing avenues for attacking the underlying tensions and thus 
undermining the insurgent’s cause.  Galula argues that even after the 
insurgency has initiated armed violence, a good COIN strategy would be to 
research insurgent demands and comprise a list that the counterinsurgent 
will immediately use to identify easily addressed complaints.  If successful, 
the entire insurgency can be undermined by addressing some of the core 
complaints or tensions that the insurgent had previously used to develop the 
insurgent cause.5 
 
Propensities and Tensions Feeding Insurgent Causes 
Appreciating the historical and cultural context is particularly important to 
understanding the dynamics of insurgencies.  The history and culture of a 
nation-state, identity group, or region is an important source of underlying 
tensions.  The collective memories of actors, kept alive through narrative 
accounts of histories often extending back hundreds or thousands of years, 
are relevant because they guide and constrain future actions.   
 
The present study refers to the influence of past events, ideas, and emotions 
on future events as the propensity of a situation.  This is not a deterministic 
relationship between past and future states, but rather a conditioning of 
future possibilities on the past.  For example, a history of exploitative 
engagements with Western nation-states and past colonizers could place a 
counterinsurgent in the unenviable position of actually having to “fight” 
history, or at least historical perception, just to be accepted as a legitimate 
actor by the local population.  This society may have a propensity for 
xenophobia and defiance against external intervention. 
 
There are multiple insurgent groups that have operated or are currently 
operating in the Philippines, including Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Moro 
National Liberation Front (MNLF), and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
                                                     
4 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 22. 
5 Ibid, 103. 
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(MILF).  These groups have exhibited very little operational synergy.  In fact, 
ASG and MILF are splinter groups from MNLF.  However, they and their 
civilian supporters share one key propensity.  They view the national 
government and any foreign military intervener on behalf of the national 
government as nothing more than an extension of unfair and brutal 
repression of Muslims, which began with Spanish colonization.  
 
Case of the Philippines 
Islam was introduced to the Philippines in the thirteenth century.  Originally, 
it was isolated to the Sulu islands but eventually spread to encompass not 
only the Sulu islands but, almost all of the southern island of Mindanao.  
Spanish conquistadors arrived shortly after the spread of Islam in 1565 and a 
brutal colonization effort was waged for three hundred and thirty four years.6  
Eventually, the Spanish relinquished control of the Philippines to the United 
States in 1898, but this almost immediately resulted in hostilities between the 
United States and the Philippines and ultimately resulted in the American-
Philippine War (1899-1902).  The bloody war that ensued produced over 
seven thousand U.S. casualties and a far greater magnitude on the Filipino 
side.  The war cost the United States $400 million to prosecute.7  The goal of 
the United States was to ultimately produce a self-governing Philippines.8  
Even though the Philippine Independence Act of 1934 was crafted 
guaranteeing a free and sovereign state, the damage done during the war—
coupled with the Spanish colonial experience—created a deep-seated mistrust 
of foreign military intervention, especially among Muslims in the south.9  
 
The animosity from this historical legacy and the resulting distrust of 
outsiders is just one of many aspects that must be taken into account when 
intervening in the Muslim-dominated regions of the Philippines.  Considering 
this obstacle, the successful trajectory of the U. S. Special Forces continuing 
Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) operation is 
particularly noteworthy.  The use of the indirect approach by U. S. Special 
Forces manifested in operating by, with, and through the Filipino military 
may have allowed the U. S. Special Forces to mitigate the negative propensity 
described above.  
                                                     
6 Thomas G. Wilson, Jr., “Extending the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao to the 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front: A Catalyst for Peace,” (MMAS Monograph: U.S. Army 
School of Advanced Military Studies, 2009), 13-14. 
7 Birtle, Andrew J., U. S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations 
Doctrine 1860-1941 (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Army Center of Military History, 2004), 
108. 
8 Ibid, 119. 
9 Also known as the Tydings-Mcduffie Act. 
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Unfortunately, propensities are not the only critical part of the operating 
environment that a counterinsurgent has to indentify and contend with.  
Underlying tensions are also an important aspect feeding into the insurgent 
cause.  Tensions exist whenever two or more opposing forces coincide.  For 
the case of insurgency, we are particularly interested in tensions arising from 
value conflict, whether this is within or between actors.  Because these 
tensions can be layered, this creates a problem of transparency.  This, in turn, 
may create a causal link problem whereby the counterinsurgent addresses the 
most recent tension being exploited by the insurgent without addressing root 
tensions or causes, which initially or more fundamentally fed the insurgent 
cause.  Conversely, new tensions may have replaced old ones, creating a 
situation whereby the counterinsurgent is wasting time and resources 
addressing the original tension(s) that were formative to the movement but 
no longer active. 
 
Case of Indonesia 
The Banda Aceh region of Indonesia located on the northern tip of the island 
of Sumatra provides an example of layered tensions that can fuel an 
insurgency.  Indonesia is a patchwork of disparate peoples, many of whom 
have only the historical experience of repressive Dutch colonialism in 
common.  Both Sukarno’s and Suharto’s dictatorial rule, while admittedly 
very brutal, helped to forge a national identity for Indonesia.  But even this 
was fragile, and poor economic and human rights treatment of the people of 
East Timor eventually led to the small southern island breaking away from 
the Indonesian nation-state.  Further, both the Papuans of West Papua and 
the Acehnese of northern Sumatra have expressed their desire for 
independence. 
 
The layering of tensions fueling the rebellion against the Indonesian 
government is most evident in the Acehnese case so it will be briefly described 
here.  The people of the province of Aceh have suffered a great deal from the 
founding of the nation through the rule of President Megawatti.  Under the 
rule of President Suharto, Indonesia was witness to a great deal of persecution 
of out-groups.  Developing his dictatorial vision of the “New Order,” Suharto 
enforced authoritarian rule to pursue economic development.  He initially 
targeted communists, culminating with the outlawing of all communist 
Cox and Ryan: Countering Insurgency
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parties.10  After dealing with the communists, Suharto turned his attentions to 
Muslim political activists, persecuting key leaders and movements.11 
 
Understandably, a resistance movement formed known as the Free Aceh 
Movement, Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), which soon drew violent 
crackdowns from the Indonesian government.  This movement has been 
labeled as a terrorist organization by the central government but there is little 
proof that GAM ever perpetrated an attack against civilian targets.  The 
present authors feel GAM would be better labeled an insurgent or secessionist 
movement although most of the actions taken by members of GAM fell under 
the domain of peaceful protest.  Despite these facts, GAM was a threat to 
Indonesian control of the province of Aceh and several notable violent clashes 
did occur between members of GAM and the Indonesian military. 
 
The tsunami of 2005, which killed over 160,000 people, changed the 
landscape and created an opportunity for the Indonesian government and 
America to step in and provide emergency aid and longer-term aid to rebuild 
the catastrophe ravaged province.  Susilo Yudhayono had only recently 
replaced Megawatti as President but he decided to extend a hand to the 
people of Aceh offering profit sharing from the massive natural gas reserves 
off the coast of Aceh as well as greater participation in Indonesian politics.12  
Stability soon returned to the region and GAM entered a period of inactivity. 
This would have been the end of the story except that a new background 
tension had already developed fueled by the same government mistreatment 
that the people of Aceh had suffered at the hands of the national government. 
 
The propensity to distrust central government rule engendered through an 
unbroken succession of Presidents willing to use heavy-handed military 
tactics against the Acehnese from Sukarno to Megawatti is now being 
enmeshed with a tension, engendered by regional terror group Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI), between religious fundamentalism and secularism.  Therefore, 
despite massive aid to the province following the tsunami of 2005 and despite 
recent political and local rule concessions granted by the Indonesian 
government to the Aceh province, a strong fundamental Islamic movement is 
                                                     
10 Ulf Sundhaussen, “Indonesia: Past and Present Encounters with Democracy,” in Larry 
Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds.), Democracy in Developing 
Nations: Asia 3 (1989), 440. 
11 William R. Liddle, “The Islamic Turn in Indonesia,” The Journal of Asian Studies 55:3 
(1996): 614. 
12 Michael Vatikiotis, “Southeast Asia in 2005: Strength in the Face of Adversity,” in Dajit 
Singh and Lorraine Carlos Salazar (eds.) Southeast Asian Affairs (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), 6. 
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forming.  It should be noted this is a novel development in Indonesian 
history.13  In 2003, Aceh’s first sharia court opened.  It was initially promised 
by local religious leaders that implementation of sharia law would be 
“moderate” and that human rights would not be abused.  However, 
punishment for failing to attend Friday prayer, for example, could be public 
caning.14  Any pretentions at moderation are quickly passing.  In Fall 2009, 
new laws passed which stated “married people convicted of adultery can be 
sentenced to death by stoning.  Unmarried people can be sentenced to 100 
lashes with a cane.”15  
 
Similarly, a specialized police unit, Wilayatul Hisbah, is now patrolling the 
streets of Aceh looking to disrupt or arrest “unmarried couples, Muslim 
women without headscarves or those wearing tight clothes, and people 
drinking alcohol or gambling,” which is apparently aimed at combating 
Western influence, especially influence that seeped into the region when 
Western nations provided post-tsunami aid.16  Even though some Acehnese 
citizens have expressed discontent with the increasingly harsh religious laws, 
most are afraid to voice their concerns for fear of being branded unreligious.17  
 
Overlaying this fundamentalist trend is increasing violence surrounding 
elections in the province and an increasingly active and violent JI.  While a 
period of quiescence has ensued after the 2005 peace agreement, if violence 
aimed at the Indonesian national government ensues again, a new tension—
religious fundamentalism vs political secularism firmly layered over old 
economic grievances and a history of poor human rights treatment—will 
create an even more complex insurgency to deal with than was ever presented 
by GAM. 
 
In summary, even if one could identify “the cause” for an insurgency, it must 
still emerge from a complex web of dynamic tensions and propensities.  As 
the underlying tensions evolve, so too can the cause. Consequently, a singular, 
                                                     
13 Vatikiotis, Michael, Indonesian Politics Under Suharto: The Rise and Fall of the New 
Order 3rd ed., (New York: Routledge, 1993), 119. 
14 “Aceh’s Sharia Court,” BBC News Online, March 4, 2003, available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/em/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/2816785.stm. 
15 “Aceh Passes Adultery Stoning Law,” BBC News Online, September 14, 2009, available 
at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/em/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/8254631.stm. 
16 “Islamic Police Tighten Grip on Indonesia’s Aceh,” The Malaysian Insider, January 14, 
2010, available at: http://themalaysianinsider.com/index.php/world/49530-islamic-
police-tighten-grip-on-indonesias-aceh. 
17 Katie Hamann, “Aceh’s Sharia Law Still Controversial in Indonesia,” VOA News, 
December 29, 2009, available at: 
http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/religion/Acehs-Sharia-Law-Still-
Controversial-in-Indonesia-80257482.html. 
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static definition of the insurgent cause is not a reliable foundation for 
planning COIN operations.  While this is already largely recognized in COIN 
doctrine and theory, the logical implications for COIN strategy have not been 
fully resolved.  A multi-causal account of insurgency requires new conceptual 
tools not available within traditional COIN theory. 
 
A Conceptual Framework for Multi-causal Insurgency 
This section develops a multi-casual framework for understanding 
insurgency.  First, a distinction is necessary between causation and insurgent 
causes.  Causation is the inference of relationships of necessity and sufficiency 
between a cause and its effects.  Research into the causes of war seeks to 
uncover this kind of causal relationship.  In the previous discussion, the 
complex web of dynamic tensions and propensities links causes and effects.  
 
In contrast, according to U.S. Field Manual (FM) 3-24, “A cause is a principle 
or movement militantly defended or supported.”18  Galula explains how a 
cause is linked with underlying tensions:   
 
“What is a political problem? It is ‘an unsolved contradiction’, 
according to Mao Tse-tung. If one accepts this definition, then a 
political cause is the championing of one side of the contradiction.”19  
 
Insurgent causes are not material causes that produce causal effects; rather 
insurgent causes provide justification for resorting to violent action.  
Although the two concepts are related, they are quite distinct and should not 
be conflated.  Causation is generally relevant to the level of tactical action, 
whereas insurgent causes influence the insurgency at the strategic level.  Both 
causation and insurgent causes will be relevant to our discussion below. 
 
Until recently, most scientific explanations of causation focused on single 
cause-effect relationships.  For example, the Guide for Understanding and 
Implementing Defense Experimentation: GUIDEx, a report produced in 
collaboration between defense scientists representing Australia, Canada, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States, asserts: 
 
“Any national or coalition capability problem may be stated as: Does A 
cause B? An experimental capability or concept—a new way of doing 
business—is examined in experimentation to determine if the 
                                                     
18 U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency (Washington, 
D.C.: HQDA, December 15, 2006), 1-10. 
19 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 10. 
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proposed capability A causes the anticipated military effect B. The 
experiment hypothesis states the causal relationship between the 
proposed solution and the problem.”20 
 
This accurately expresses the classical scientific view of experimentation.  The 
GUIDEx goes on to say that an important criteria of a good experiment is the 
ability to isolate the reason for change in the effect B.21  In this paradigm, the 
goal of experimentation is to answer the question of causation between one 
independent variable and one dependent variable.  The method of 
experimentation is to create a closed system to eliminate alternative sources 
of variation that could confound the experimental result.  In this paradigm, 
accumulated knowledge from multiple experiments permits reasoning about 
causal chains:  A causes B, which causes C, which causes D.  
 
Although scientists may occasionally approximate the ideal conditions of a 
closed system for long enough to isolate a single independent variable, this 
degree of control is of course impossible in any human society.  The societies 
in which insurgencies foment are open systems, characterized by perpetual 
novelty and an uncountable number of independent variables.  Here, 
causality is networked, and cannot be reduced to single cause-effect 
relationships, or even to linear causal chains. 
 
Complex systems science provides an alternative perspective capable of 
making sense of networked causality.  Distributed networks of autonomous 
agents that make local decisions based on local information characterize 
complex adaptive systems.  From these individual local choices, global 
patterns emerge and feed back to affect the subsequent decisions of the 
autonomous agents.  As a result of these iterative feedback cycles, causation is 
complex, networked, and circular.  Perturbation of A may ripple out to affect 
B, C, and D, which in turn affects A.  Thus, not only do causes have effects but, 
those effects may actually have caused the cause!  
 
If this all sounds unnecessarily convoluted, it is worthwhile considering the 
very real effects these feedback loops can generate.  A classic example is the 
self-fulfilling prophecy of a bank run.  A rumor that a bank is in financial 
difficulty—even when it is not—may cause cautious investors to withdraw 
                                                     
20 The Technical Cooperation Program, Guide for Understanding and Implementing 
Defense Experimentation (Ottawa, Canada: Canadian Forces Experimentation Centre, 
February 2006), available at: 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/ttcp/reference/docs/GUIDExBookFeb2006.pdf. 
21 Ibid, 13. 
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their money.  Seeing long queues of customers withdrawing their savings 
causes more customers to withdraw their savings, and the problem snowballs.   
Before the end of the day, the bank has exhausted its liquid reserves, and 
actually is insolvent.  Perceptions and rumors can have similar and no less 
dramatic effects during revolutions and counter insurgencies.  Galula cites the 
effective use of the slogan “Land to the Tiller” by the Chinese Communists to 
promote the false idea that land ownership in China was concentrated in the 
hands of a small minority.22  
 
Complex Systems and Intervention Options 
Complex systems exhibit self-organization, emergence, hysteresis, latent 
pathways, and adaptation.  Understanding each of these concepts provides 
important insights for COIN theory, and opens up new intervention options 
for counterinsurgents.  
 
Self-organization 
Self-organization is the spontaneous increase in order over time in an open 
system.  It is spontaneous in the sense that it is not externally imposed, but 
accrues through interactions between parts of the system as energy flows 
through it.  A widely studied model of self-organization demonstrates a 
spontaneous increase in organization when agents set their color by following 
two rules.  The first rule, short-range activation, sets the color preference to 
the most common color of the agent’s closest neighbors.  The second rule, 
long-range inhibition, sets the color preference to be opposite of the most 
common color of the agent’s more distant neighbors.  Other parameters of the 
model include the radius for the nearest neighbors, the radius for the distant 
neighbors, and the weighting given to short range activation versus long-
range inhibition.  The outcome of this model is shown in Figure 1.  Within five 
time steps, an initially random mix of black and white agents has self-
organized into a pattern of black and white stripes.  With different initial 
conditions, the model will produce black and white stripes different in detail, 
but with the same qualitative pattern.  With different parameter settings, the 
same rule set can produce uniformly black or white agents, black spots on a 
white background, or vice versa.  This very simple model has been used to 
explain growth and differentiation of the structure of an organism, pattern 
formation in animal fur, and the clustering of industries in regional 
economics.23  
                                                     
22 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 17. 
23 Alan M. Turing, "The Chemical Basis of Morphogenesis, Philosophical Transactions of 
the Royal Society of London," Series B, Biological Sciences 237:641 (1952), 37-72; 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 8, No. 1
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Figure 1: Pattern Formation as an Example of Self-Organization 
and Emergence 
 
         
 
 
 
In the COIN literature, it is common to divide the population into three 
states:  Actively supporting the Government, the neutral majority, and 
actively supporting the insurgency.  Accepting this simplification for the 
present discussion, the dynamics of self-organization help to explain why one 
village can be pro-Government, while a nearby village with identical social 
conditions supports the insurgency.  Because an actor’s choice of state is 
conditioned by the states of others in the actor’s social network, a population 
that is compelled to choose between insurgents and counterinsurgents will 
tend to cluster into spatially organized patterns over time.  
 
The first implication of self-organization is that the spatial distribution of pro-
Government and pro-insurgent populations is more important than the total 
proportion of the population in each state.  Measures of effectiveness that 
aggregate national statistical data can be misleading.  A color-coded map that 
shows patterns of allegiance over time provides a much richer assessment 
tool.  In COIN, the local situation can be very different from the neighboring 
local situation and from the regional situation.   Therefore, decision-makers at 
lower levels need greater autonomy to tailor plans to their local context.  Of 
course, the importance of bottom-up intelligence flows and devolving 
decisions to the lowest levels are already standard tenets of COIN doctrine.24 
The jointly published U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps doctrine 
Counterinsurgency describes COIN as “a shifting ‘mosaic war’ that is difficult 
for counterinsurgents to envision as a coherent whole.”25 What is new here is 
that self-organization provides a theoretical explanation for the “mosaic war” 
                                                                                                                                                 
Nagorcka BN and JR Mooney, "From stripes to spots: prepatterns which can be produced 
in the skin by a reaction-diffusion system," IMA Journal of Mathematics Applied in 
Medicine and Biology 9:4 (1992): 249-67; Paul Krugman, "A Dynamic Spatial Model," 
National Bureau Of Economic Research Working Paper No. 4219 (Cambridge, MA: 
National Bureau of Economic Research, November 1992). 
24 Department of the Army, Field Manaul 3-24, 1-26 and 3-31. 
25 Ibid,1-8. 
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observed in practice, a justification for decentralized execution of COIN 
operations, and a prescription for assessment of progress. 
 
The second implication of self-organization is that indirect approaches lead to 
more radical transformations in the observed pattern than direct 
intervention.  The patterns formed are attractors in a dynamical system, and 
tend to be robust to local perturbation.  For the majority of agents in Figure 1, 
changing their color from black to white has no permanent effect on the 
system.  The unchanged state of their neighbors simply means the agent will 
flip back in the next time step.  Direct action will only work if a critical 
number of agents are simultaneously flipped.  Even then, as long as the 
underlying calculus of the agents remains unchanged, direct action will likely 
only redistribute the location of black and white stripes, and have no long-
term effect on their relative proportion.  In contrast, a relatively small shift in 
the weighting between the short-range activation and long-range inhibition 
rules can qualitatively change the observed patterns.  The change sweeps 
through the system using exactly the same self-organizing dynamics that 
perpetuated the original pattern.  In COIN, this means that in general, taking 
indirect action to alter the calculus of the population in choosing whether to 
support the insurgents or the Government is likely to be more effective for 
transformation than coercion through population control measures. 
 
Emergence 
The patterns produced by self-organizing systems are emergent.  Emergence 
means the whole is different from the sum of its parts.26  In science, there is 
an emergence hierarchy between physics, chemistry, biology, and psychology.  
The laws of chemistry are constrained by, but additional to, the laws of 
physics.  Biology is constrained by the laws of chemistry, and chemicals are 
the building blocks of cells, but chemistry also introduces new theories to 
explain life.  Psychology is constrained by biology, but again new theories 
operate at the level of mind.  At each level, theory is constrained by lower 
levels, but it also has some autonomy from the level below.  New concepts and 
new rules are needed to explain regularities at the higher level.  In Figure 1, 
one can meaningfully talk about stripes and spots in relation to the whole.  
Yet, at the level of individual agents, the rule set operates only on local 
information about the color of close and distant neighbors.  Stripes and spots 
are emergent properties that are meaningless at the individual level.  Patterns 
that emerge from one level provide the building blocks for systems at the next 
level up. 
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In the same way, there is an emergence hierarchy in counterinsurgency 
warfare.  The operational level of warfare is not simply the aggregation of 
tactical engagements.  The strategic level that connects the military 
instrument with policy is qualitatively different than the operational level, 
which plans and executes the campaign within the theatre of operations.  
Different concepts are required for different levels of war.  For example, 
Stathis Kalyvas finds in his detailed study of violence in civil war, especially in 
the Greek Civil War, that people, far from being unified to act violently 
because of fear, ideology, or prewar political social polarization, acted 
violently selectively for very sub-regional, even local reasons.27  Kalyvas is not 
arguing that all violence is local for political and insurgent leaders can 
certainly move people and groups to violence.  Instead, he is attempting to 
differentiate between the macro and micro motives that move people to 
violence in all conflicts. As Kalyvas argues,  
 
“indiscriminate violence is an informational shortcut that may backfire 
on those who use it; selective violence is jointly produced by political 
actors seeking information and individuals trying to avoid the worst—
but also grabbing what opportunities the predicament affords them.”28  
 
Kalyvas notes that civil wars are distinct from interstate wars mainly through 
the level of intimacy each exhibits.  Interstate wars are affairs between 
strangers and thus lack intimacy but civil wars, and we would argue 
insurgencies as well, are wars against countrymen, neighbors, and even 
relatives.29  Neighbors, relatives, and friends would regularly denounce each 
other to legitimate and illegitimate authorities for myriad reasons including 
jealousy and personnel grievance.  It was a short step from denunciation to 
violence, for neighbors, relatives, and friends, if the opportunity afforded it.30  
Some people were genuinely moved by their leaders’ political motives but 
many others are found in civil war and insurgency to be motivated by petty 
and extremely personal agendas.  
 
The implication of Kalyvas’ study and our current work is that it is misguided 
to establish an operational campaign aimed at the cause or the center of 
gravity.  As Kalyvas notes, many scholars and practitioners find the cause of 
                                                     
27 Kalyvas, Stathis N, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), 328. 
28 Ibid, 388.  
29 Ibid, 330-33. 
30 Ibid, 333-4. 
Cox and Ryan: Countering Insurgency
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015
56 
 
violence to be impenetrable so they hand-wave “explanations for violence 
emphasizing collective emotions, ideologies, and cultures that have low 
explanatory power.”31  Therefore, the best campaign plan might be to allow 
brigade and battalion commanders a great deal of latitude in dealing with the 
local motives for violence in a counterinsurgency since motives might be 
macro, micro, or a mix of the two.   
 
Hysteresis 
The third concept from complex systems science, hysteresis, is a non-linear 
behavior encountered in a wide variety of processes ranging from 
ferroelectricity to biology, where the input-output dynamic relations between 
variables involve memory effects.32  Hysteresis implies path dependence.  
When a system returns to a previous state, it may behave differently.  
Moreover, different paths to the same state can result in different behavior.  
Consequently, in systems with hysteresis, it is insufficient to only know the 
current state.  The history of the system is essential for making sense of future 
possible patterns of behavior. 
 
Path dependence and the importance of history are hardly new to the 
counterinsurgent.  The significance of hysteresis is in targeting insurgent 
causes.  Once a Government loses legitimacy, addressing stated grievances 
would not automatically win back popular support.  For example, in Egypt, 
President Mubarak’s concession in response to mass protests may have 
actually emboldened the protesters to raise additional demands and led to 
wider support.  A more sophisticated approach is required to counter 
insurgent causes. 
 
Instead of reacting to the insurgent causes directly, counterinsurgents need to 
understand how causes relate to dominant narratives within a society.  
Narratives are not simply a disinterested chronology of events.  The choice of 
perspective from which the story is told, which actors are given a voice and 
which are ignored, which events are emphasized and which are omitted, as 
well as the bounding of the narrative in time and geography all affect the 
implied moral of the story.  The sequencing of events, feelings, and actions 
can be used to suggest relationships between effects and their causes. 
Insurgent causes that can be connected with existing narratives are more 
                                                     
31 Ibid, 388. 
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likely to achieve resonance within a society, which can greatly expand the 
base of support. 
 
Once insurgent causes become associated with a narrative, directly countering 
the narrative may inadvertently strengthen it.  George Lakoff uses a simple 
example to illustrate this point.  The effect of the instruction “Don’t think of 
an elephant!” is invariably the opposite of its intent.  Elinor Ochs and Lisa 
Capps make the point that  
 
“counternarratives do not necessarily involve overt reference to a 
prevailing narrative world view. It is the voicing of a disjunctive reality 
itself that constitutes the counterpoint. Indeed, the posing of an 
alternative account may be more effective in dismantling the status 
quo perspective than overt critiques. In making reference to them, 
critiques perpetuate the salience of the dominant discourses they 
otherwise aim to uproot.”33 
 
Effectively countering insurgent causes requires the fostering of new 
identities and a narrative that voices a “disjunctive reality.” A good example of 
this is the change in usage of “United States” prior to the American Civil War 
as a plural noun, to a singular noun afterwards, representing a transformation 
from “Union” to nation.  
 
Lincoln’s wartime speeches betokened this transition. In his first inaugural 
address, he used the word “Union” twenty times and the word “nation” not 
once... In his letter to Horace Greeley of August 22, 1862, on the relationship 
of slavery to the war, Lincoln spoke of the Union eight times and of the nation 
not at all. Little more than a year later, in his address at Gettysburg, the 
president did not refer to the “Union” at all but used the word “nation” five 
times to invoke a new birth of freedom and nationalism for the United States. 
And in his second inaugural address, looking back over the events of the past 
four years, Lincoln spoke of one side seeking to dissolve the Union in 1861 
and the other accepting the challenge of war to preserve the nation.34 
 
Lincoln used language to help forge new identities and shape narratives as 
America emerged from civil war. A narrative emphasizing nationalism 
reframed political discourse away from the divisive Union and Confederate 
terminology.  
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Latent pathways 
Complex systems are highly networked.  This gives rise to the fourth concept 
from complex systems science: energy, matter, and information flows along 
multiple pathways.  Observing the current pattern of behavior only provides 
information about active pathways; latent pathways may not be visible.  
Consequently, complex systems generally exhibit graceful degradation. When 
one pathway is blocked, latent pathways are activated to preserve system 
functionality.  The so-called balloon effect is a good example of multiple 
pathways in a complex system.  To counter the Medellin cartel’s drug 
smuggling operations between Columbia and the United States, the South 
Florida Drug Task Force conducted a successful operation that dramatically 
reduced the volume of drugs entering Florida via the Caribbean.  However, 
this did not stop the flow of drugs into the United States.  In response, 
Columbian cartels established relationships with Mexican marijuana cartels 
to smuggle narcotics across the 2000 mile shared border with the United 
States.  The current violence of the Mexican drug war is an indirect result of 
successfully closing down one pathway within a complex system. 
 
The concept of multiple pathways is related to insurgent causes.  One should 
expect that effectively addressing one cause would activate new pathways for 
mobilizing the insurgency.  This reinforces the dangers of focusing on a single 
insurgent cause.  Even though latent pathways in a complex system may not 
be obvious from observing the current pattern of behavior, it is possible to 
anticipate alternative pathways before they are activated.  This is where an 
understanding of the underlying tensions and propensity within the society is 
critical, because it illuminates contradictions that the insurgents may seek to 
exploit.  Identifying potential out-groups, such as the Shiite population in 
Bahrain, also allows the counterinsurgent to anticipate the kind of grievances 
insurgents may use to mobilize these out-groups, and then take steps to 
mitigate these latent pathways before they are activated. 
 
Adaptation 
The final complex systems concept considered here is adaptation.  COIN 
theorists often remark upon the adaptive nature of insurgents.  FM 3-24 
claims that competent insurgents are adaptive.35  Yet, paradoxically, it is the 
relative weakness of insurgent forces that provides them an edge in 
adaptability.  Complex systems scientists have drawn on Charles Darwin’s 
theory of evolution to show why insurgents adapt faster and more 
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effectively.36  Adaptation requires the presence of variation, selection, and 
replication.  In an asymmetric conflict, the weaker side usually contains more 
diversity, are subject to a stronger selection pressure than the pressure they 
exert on the strong side, and are exposed to combat for longer, which 
replicates combat experience.37  This theory is supported quantitatively with 
data from both Iraq and Afghanistan, which shows that the average time 
interval between fatal improvised explosive devise attacks increases 
logarithmically over the duration of the war.38  To paraphrase Megginson’s 
paraphrasing of Darwin, it is not the strongest insurgencies that survive, nor 
the most intelligent, but rather the most adaptable to change. 
 
Given the central importance of adaptation in COIN, counterinsurgents need 
to both improve their own adaptability and counter the adaptability of the 
insurgent.  This requires increased variation in our own forces, stronger 
selection pressure, and faster replication of successful innovations.  Counter-
adaptation requires weakening or distorting the evolutionary pressure applied 
to insurgents.  Lieutenant Colonel Michael Ryan, Australian Army, 
deliberately used counter-adaptation against the Taliban as the commander 
of the 1st Reconstruction Task Force in Oruzgan Province, Afghanistan.  
 
Recent advances in evolutionary theory provide new insights into how to 
leverage the power of adaptation.  The evolution of evolvability—second order 
adaptation—applies evolution to the process of evolution itself.  For example, 
the way that variation is generated is far from random, because it has adapted 
to produce genotypic variation in areas that are correlated with the greatest 
environmental flux, while error-correcting codes protect regions associated 
with critical functionality from too much variation.  Second order adaptation 
enables counterinsurgents to accelerate their rate of adaptation.  As a simple 
example, the use of after-action reviews (AAR) helps units to learn and adapt. 
Adapting how AARs are conducted to improve their effectiveness is a second-
order adaptation.  
 
Evolutionary biologists are now also accepting that selective pressure applies 
not just at the level of the gene, but also to organisms and even groups of 
organisms.  While selection pressures at the lowest level of selection are the 
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most rapid and strongest in magnitude, the subtle effects of group selection 
may actually dominate over longer time scales.  A multilevel view of selection 
points to a potential key advantage for counterinsurgents.  Even if insurgents 
have an advantage in tactical adaptation because of their highly variable and 
decentralized structure, counterinsurgents can still be more adaptive at the 
operational and strategic levels, because they are better integrated.  The 
slower, but more strategic adaptations of the counterinsurgent may steer 
insurgents into a corner where faster tactical adaptation becomes largely 
irrelevant.  However, this requires counterinsurgents to deliberately work to 
improve their higher-level adaptive mechanisms.  
 
Conclusion: Implications for COIN Approaches 
Given what has been argued thus far, a premium is placed on developing 
historical and cultural intelligence on the leader and member mindset.  What 
has propelled these individuals to transmutate from peaceful political 
grievance to violent rebellion?  This is just one example of a cogent question 
that must be answered before the cause can be fully understood and dealt 
with.  Such cultural and historical intelligence necessitates that deep 
knowledge be developed on the insurgent identity group(s) but that is a 
positive development as it narrows the scope of study when addressing the 
insurgent cause.  For example, in terms of operations and tactics, it is 
certainly important to know that Iraqi citizens harbor a deep distaste for dogs.  
However, this information is of little use in developing a plan to combat the 
insurgent cause, excepting, of course, that employment of culturally 
insensitive tactics only adds fuel to the insurgent cause. 
 
What needs to be discerned are the historical, political, and cultural 
antecedents to insurgency.  One needs to understand the historical 
propensities the will have to be considered when developing a campaign to 
combat the insurgency.  But one also needs to know the individual tensions in 
society, like discrimination against certain minorities, historical economic 
exploitation of a region, religious discrimination, etc. that are not only 
currently being used by the insurgents to develop their cause and broaden 
their appeal, but also tensions that could be exploited in the future either to 
expand the insurgency or can be shifted to if the counterinsurgent is 
successful in combating one or more of the original tensions that fueled the 
insurgent cause. 
 
The counterinsurgent would take all of this into consideration developing a 
more sophisticated Galulesque list of not only insurgent demands but, 
underlying tensions and propensities which are feeding these demands.  
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Galula suggests immediately addressing the demands that the legitimate 
national government can and ignoring the rest.39  The present authors do not 
suggest this course of action.  Before meeting even a single demand or 
addressing a single underlying tension in society one must attempt to think 
through how injecting energy into the system will affect the overall system.  
For example, does dealing with the underlying poverty in a society push the 
insurgent to a more religious tension from which to fuel the insurgency?  Are 
there tensions the other tensions the insurgents are not using which could be 
co-opted after poverty is addressed?  When one views just the cause through 
the lens of complexity, it becomes clear that engaging in counterinsurgency is 
a very messy endeavor. 
 
Also, it should become clear from this analysis that COIN operations will have 
to be very fluid and undergo a process of constant revision as one notes 
changes in the environmental frame.  Such an approach should also help one 
to successfully categorize what type of insurgency is being presented.  Bard 
O’Neill makes a valiant attempt at disaggregating types of insurgency noting 
that each type demands a different COIN approaches to address it.40  This 
implies that certain strategies might work with some insurgencies while they 
inadvertently fuel others making identification of the tensions and cause even 
more important. 
 
The current situation in Pakistan serves as an illustrative example.  The 
Pakistani government has always had great trouble penetrating and 
controlling the Baluchistani area and Northwest Frontier Porvince (NWFP).  
This problem has become particularly acute in the post-Musharef era and the 
Pakistani Taliban have experienced success exploiting this historical lack of 
control coupled with the chaos created by the fall of Musharef.  The 
government initially attempted to offer conciliations to the Pakistani Taliban 
such as more local autonomy and stricter religious standards in schooling and 
local law enforcement.  But this approach soon backfired as the Taliban rather 
than entering into a period of calm inactivity actually became emboldened 
and challenged the rule of the national government more forcefully.  A messy 
and violent counterinsurgency campaign ensued and the outcome regarding 
whom will eventually rule Pakistan is still in doubt.   
 
Noting all of the above, conciliations given to insurgents has been successfully 
employed as a counterinsurgent strategy in past insurgencies, but according 
to the 2010 RAND study How Insurgencies End this is rare, occurring in less 
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than a third of modern insurgencies.  Notable twentieth century examples 
include El Salvador, Guatemala, South Africa, and Northern Ireland.41  The 
key is in understanding the system, propensities, and tensions that feed and 
frame the cause before attacking the cause. 
 
In the final analysis, if one takes Kalyvas’s thesis that all violence is local at 
face value, and one recognizes the complexity of social interactions, then one 
must also admit that causes will be highly personalized.  One person might 
join the insurgency out of a real hatred for the central government.  Another 
might join for social reasons.  Still others might be drawn for religious reasons 
or even by the allure of potential criminality.  Not only will different people 
and different groups join for different reasons but the main cause will likely 
shift over time.   
 
This article is aimed at beginning the conversation and shifting the mindset of 
counterinsurgency researchers.  Without a more sophisticated approach 
toward understanding the causes of insurgency, countering them will be 
impossible. 
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